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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
"

NATHAN SEAMONS as the sur-riving partner of SEAMONS & LOVELAND.
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant,
-vs-

BRIEF OF

LARRY D. ANDERSON and
HANS P. ANDERSON.
Defendants and Appellants,
and RICHARD PETERSON,
Defendant, Counter-Claimant,
Cross-Claimant, Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and
RAY BITTERS. Co-Partners. doing
business in the firm name and style
of VALLEY CAR MARKET,
Defendants and CrossAppellants.

DEFENDANTS AND
APPELLANTS
ANDERSONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
Case No. 7691

STATEME'JY1l OF FACTS

The ?\Iercury car 'va~ repossessed from appellants on
~ray 2:3, 1949 hy· \T alle:v Car ).f arket and turned to the
l)(>ssPssion of plaintiff on August 15, 1949 (R. 2), and
plainti l'f held pos~P~sion tlH reof until commencement
of tlH• aetion until at h~ast December 11, 1950 (R. 152).
liP did not conunence the actjon until April 17, 1950
(~P(• filing date on baek of complaint R. 3).
1

':Ph<' plainti l'f h:· his original co1nplaint sought to
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foreclose a mortgage (R. 3), but it cannot be ascertained

whether he was preceding under 104-55-1 DCA, 1943,
or under Title 13, UCA, 1943. His first amended complaint sounding in declaratory judgment was abandoned,
•
and then his second amended complaint appears to revert to the foreclosure theory in equity (R. 40).
ARGUMENT -

POINT ONE

The plaintiff cannot recover against appellants in
any event. If he proceeded as in case of real property
foreclosure he is barred by Chapter 55, l;CA, 1943, because he must have judgment before seizure, deficiency
judgment after execution and sheriff's sale, and is also
barred by 13-0-10, UCA, 1943 because he failed to make
a sale within 30 days after seizure.
He is barred from forecloseure by advertisement
because he failed to give notice of the sale, 13-0-8, UCA,
1943.
Suppose he had sold the car within 30 days after
seizure. I-Ie asked judgment against appellants in the
sum of $1648.06 (R. 4), and it was worth between
$1700.00 and $1800.00 (R. 141). The jur~T so found, and
plaintiff has not appealed fro1n. this finding.
Plaintiff now contends this to be a chattel n1ortgage.
I-Ie cites a case on page 5 of his brief. This 'vas on mining property· a:nd real property providing for execution
of a deed. Ours 'vas a conditional sales agreement anrl
is so called through a1J of the plPadings of plaintiff.
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Plaintiff states on page 6 of his brief that he sold the
paper to Commercial Credit Company. The forms were
furnished by the Co1npany.
The character of the instrument is fixed by the intention of the parties to it at the time of it's execution.
14 C. J. S. p. 578, par. 3,

... ''the character of the transaction is fixed at
its inception, and if an instrument is a mortgage
'vhen executed its character does not afterward
change, for once a mortgage always a mortgage,
is a maxim of law."
It is a surprise to us that counsel does not know the
common ordinary 1neaning of a mortgage. If Anderson had borrowed money from Valley or plaintiff, and
executed the docun1ent in question, then it could have
been a n1ortgage regardless of the form of it. But, he
bought a car, and the document merely represented the
halance of the unpaid purchase price. The question here
presented was set at rest in the lTtah case of Campbell
vs. Peter (1945), 162 P. 2d 754 overruling a former case,
and approving the case of Stillman v. Lynch, (Utah)
192 P. 272. The Lynch case stated flatly, saying:
"As we read the statutes of Utah, a title retaining note is neither in fact nor in law a chattel 1nortgage. It has none of the characteristics,
indicia, or elements of a chattel mortgage, except
that of security". (See other Utah cases therein
cited.)
. . \ long- linP of

~" nnotations

appear in A. Ij. R. term-
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inating at 175 A. L. R. 1374. The distinction is well
put by the annotator at page 1379,
. . . ''it is not the office of a conditional bill of
sale to secure a loan of m'Oney; its purpose rather is to permit an owner of personal property
to make a bona fide sale on credit reserving title
in himself, for security until the purchase price
is fully paid."
SUMMARY - Plaintiff cannot recover against appellants under any theory. If it is a conditional sales
contract, the car was worth more when seized than the
obligation. He treated it as his own property and not for
security. It was held for nearly a year and a half before final sale, and it was driven 7000 miles. The
foreclosure of a chattel mortgage must be accomplished
strictly under the provisions of the statute, and this was
not done. I have carefully and more fully briefed all
points to the District Court, and desire to shorten this
and save costs by referring thereto (R. 92).
Respectfttlly subntitted

GEO. D. PRESTON
Attorney for Appellants
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